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INFORMATION RIGHTS, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:
A PRÉCIS ON INTELLECTUAL AND
CONTEXTUAL ISSUES FOR LIBRARY
AND INFORMATION SCIENCE1
by John Buschman

T

he conference call for papers for the 2011 Information Ethics
Roundtable on Information Rights as Human Rights asks a series
of non-rhetorical questions such as: are information rights best
conceived merely as liberties; are information rights instrumental; what
are the possible conﬂicts between intellectual property and information
rights; and what are the drawbacks of taking a human rights approach
to information ethics? A prominent author on information ethics in the
library and information science (LIS) ﬁeld like Mathiesen (2008) works on
information rights from the vantage of moral theory, and thus casts access
to information as a welfare right. That is, as an obligation of the state.
Another prominent author on information ethics in the LIS ﬁeld – Samek
(2007) – views information rights as a core value of librarianship to be
put into action in a meaningful and global way. Both believe that other
rights – human, educational, expressive, and political – are essentially
fallow at best, or meaningless at worst without this primary right. Both
also subscribe to an extension of the postwar global political settlement
that Rawls describes: an agreement that war is justiﬁed only to protect
international security and that state sovereignty is limited by human rights
(Beitz and Goodin 2009, 1). Therein lies something of our quandary:
rights (including informational rights) are formed, enforced, and come
to life in political contexts. We should then query political theory –
speciﬁcally the resources of democratic theory – as to the intellectual and
contextual issues surrounding human and information rights because “it
is now virtually axiomatic that constructive theorizations about politics
must take their bearings from an acceptance of the priorities and principles
of democratic theory” (Mara 2008, 1). Essentially, we should interrogate
that central theoretical source that grapples with the fundamental political
contexts of rights of any sort. That is the purpose of this paper, and it
addresses a version of the last of those questions noted: what are some of
the drawbacks to taking a human rights approach to information rights?
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The Context: Sources of Rights and Some of Their Problems
To begin, if we take the formulation of the “right to have rights” (Benhabib
in Catiglione 2005, 20) as foundational, then rights are fundamental
and universal, they are quite often theorized to exist independently of
particular legal and political systems, they are normative and binding on
their face, they must be asserted and occasionally politically protected
in some instances, and they are minimal (Brown 1993, 1-14). In other
words, rights are enacted politically, but do not originate politically.
Sitting lightly behind this conception are metaphysical or religious ideas:
that a relationship to a higher or purer plane of existence is the source
of what makes humanity special, and thus the repository of rights exists
outside of any human political or social structure (Brown 1993). This
tradition is not to be taken lightly. Man in the image of God was the source
of ideas as basic as natural rights, the dignity of the human person, and
the right to a living wage (Brown 1993, 25-36). The resolutely secular
democratic theorist Sheldon Wolin notes that “the historical contribution
of western religions to the political education of ordinary and poor people
is almost impossible to exaggerate,” leading to enhanced roles for women,
an advocacy for the poor, and social solidarity (1996, 37). But, with this
come all of the problems of belief and faith: lack of proof of the existence
of the source of those rights, conﬂicting values that cannot be adjudicated
because faith cannot be compromised, and so on. In a now-humorous
illustration of this conundrum, the French representative to the UNESCO
Commission in 1948, having agreed to support the Universal Declaration
of the Rights of Man along with the Soviet Union and other representatives
of wildly divergent political perspectives, said that “we agree on these
rights, providing we are not asked why” (in Brown 1993, 25). Ignatieff
writes that “Unless you think that human beings are sacred, there seems
no persuasive reason to believe that their dignity should be protected with
rights” (2000, 340). To have to rationally justify universal rights in 1948
would have descended into arbitrary dogmatism or the agreement itself
would have been stopped by irreconcilable differences (Brown 1993, 25).
The famous counterarguments parallel the refutations of proofs of faith.
Jeremy Bentham in the late 18th and early 19th century wrote two early
and famous rebuttals: “right is with me a child of the law; a natural right
is a son that never had a father” (in Brown 1993, 9). That is, rights are
man-made and based in law. As Dewey put it, inhering negative rights
are mythical and philosophically indefensible: the individual and her/
his rights are “nothing ﬁxed, given ready-made” and “already there”
(1935, 227; 1960c, 268-269). Even more famous is Bentham’s retort that
“reasons for wishing there were such things as rights, are not rights; …
want is not supply – hunger is not bread. That which has no existence
cannot be destroyed. … Natural rights is … nonsense upon stilts” (1961,
347). Two hundred years later, MacIntyre famously wrote that “there are
no such rights, and belief in them is one with the belief in witches and
unicorns. The best reason for asserting so bluntly that there are not such
rights is … the same … reason … for asserting that there are no unicorns:
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every attempt to give good reason for believing there are such rights has
failed” (in Dembour 2010, 17). At best, human (or natural) rights end up
in an uneasy, untenable, or insoluble tension between metaphysical and
secular bases (Dembour 2010, 6; Rorty 1990, 6-8, 22-23; Ignatieff 2000,
340). At the same time, post-metaphysical justiﬁcations (and there are
several) seemingly avoid articulating the actual needs and responsibilities
deﬁned by belonging to the human species that moral traditions precisely
draw upon to bolster human rights and human dignity (Mara 2005, 22).
Ignatieff further points out the morally and ethically dubious result that
such a grounding of human rights privilege humans above all other species
by, for instance, allowing medical experimentation on the non-human
(2000, 341).
Rights: Intellectual-Practical Issues
If those are the broad theoretical conundrums concerning human rights at
the heart of democratic theory, there are a number of intellectual, practical,
and theoretical issues as well. First and foremost, it is widely agreed that for
rights to be truly universal, they should be minimal in order to “respect the
right of those groups to deﬁne the type of collective life they wish to lead,”
and the illimitable variety that humans exhibit (Ignatieff 2000, 298; Nickel
2010; Mathiesen 2008). This means that rights are “more concerned with
avoiding the terrible than with achieving the best,” and so forbid slavery,
genocide, rape, torture, discrimination, and so on (Nickel 2010). Three
things ﬂow from this. First, many societies and their religious and ethical
traditions often limit the rights of women, children, orphans, un-dowered
brides, and so on – yet those societies do have a right to self-deﬁne their
collective lives (Ignatieff 2000). Second, the stateless do not have rights
and are essentially abandoned, without rights (Bernstein 2010; YoungBruehl 2010). However, those who advocate for human rights among
the dispossessed, stateless, and dominated are, effectively, politically
speaking for another group. They tend to be based in western societies
both wealthy enough to support such advocacy, and where rights are both
honored and legally protected. How far that representation extends goes
to the heart of the question of just how far universal human rights extend
and where political self-determination kicks in (Ignatieff 2000, 291292). In contemporary terms, do they (the wealthier and more powerful)
have the right to speak for them (the poor and powerless)? Is this just
western cultural imperialism? Third and last, if rights truly are universal
and thus minimal, extrapolating from expressive and conscience rights to
education and access to information is open to charges of hostility to other
traditions: “moral globalization—human rights—follows behind as the
legitimizing ideology of global capitalism. ‘Given the class interest of the
internationalist class carrying out this agenda, the claim to universalism is
a sham. Universalism is mere globalism’” (Ignatieff 2000, 332).
The universalism of human rights stands as a challenge to state sovereignty
– as noted earlier. Yet the political reality is that democratic states are
the most likely to actually protect and promote human rights generally
Progressive Librarian #38/39
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and vitally protect the most basic ones: “No substantial famine has ever
occurred in any country with a democratic form of government and a
relatively free press” (Sen in Ignatieff 2000, 346). Human rights in those
states take the form of individual citizenship rights, developed in concert
and in contention with capitalism and its legal structures and protections.
In other words, the most successful models of human rights are deeply
entangled with the development of capitalism, leading to pragmatic
problems, contradictions, and tensions within democratic societies (Somers
1993, 587-588, Marshall 2009; Howard 2006). To give just one instance,
Locke – the source of so much that came to fruition in an American
Constitution and the original Bill of Rights – roots an enormous amount
of his political thinking in property rights: only the propertied had the
free time, education, and judgment for citizenship, and thus rights. “The
working class was, in effect, in but not of civil society” for Locke; property
accumulation (via competition) was rationality in its essence, and civil
society was established to protect unequal holdings of property – there was
no assumption that rights, rooted as they were in Locke, would or should
be inherently respected (Macpherson 1966, 67-72; Locke 1996). Locke’s
thinking – the substantial basis of what we now experience as actual rights
– would now fail as justiﬁcation for universal human rights since they are
fundamentally unequal based on property and there is no inherent human
obligation to respect them (Macpherson 1967, 11). Rooted as we are in
Locke, this is not an anomaly. Corporations are deemed to be persons for
the purposes of equal protection (Santa Clara County v. Southern Paciﬁc
Railroad Co. 1886) and free speech rights: long before Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission (2010), the Supreme Court declared that
“the inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the
public does not depend on the identity of its source, whether corporation,
association, union, or individual” (First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
1978). In contrast, citizenship guarantees (in the form of equal protection)
and its necessary conditions (such as a minimum and equalizing education)
were undermined for African Americans in the aftermath of Reconstruction
(Liu 2006-2007, 353-356) and education is resolutely deemed not a right
by the Supreme Court (San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez
1973). Furthermore, intellectual property is rooted in Locke (Biron), thus
claims to share it as a human right (the core idea behind information rights),
and obligations to limit accumulation based on intellectual property have a
tenuous hold – mostly moral, but not political.
On the opposite end of the spectrum (and in tension with these intellectual
trends), historically democratic citizenship rights have broadly extended
beyond the merely basic to “rights of social citizenship” that have enabled
some claims on the state like welfare and public education (Somers 1993,
587-588, Marshall 2009). Social citizenship rights are intellectually most
comfortably situated in Marxist traditions that stress “positive entitlements
to participate fully in the public life of society”; Marxist societies were
admittedly friendly to human rights only to the extent that they were
“consistent with the building of socialism,” but that tradition did point
out the hypocrisy of “allowing” the poor meaningless social, housing,
Page 20
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nutritional, and educational choices they could not afford (Hollenbach
1979, 20-24). Thus in the United States, there is no national right to an
education, let alone an equal basic education for citizenship (Lui 20062007; Katz 1982; 2008). It is a good idea, but not a right. The Lockean
trumping of economic rights over social citizenship rights can be seen in the
advance of neoliberalism over the last thirty ﬁve years – and contemporarily
in the Tea Party movement. We are seeing a sustained political attack
on equal education and the social safety net in the name of economic
competitiveness (King 2011; Bourdieu 1998). Closely related, we have
seen a reaction against what has been called “rights talk”(Glendon 1991)
itself: the “tendency to deﬁne anything desirable as a right ends up eroding
the legitimacy of a defensible core of rights” (Ignatieff 2000, 346; Bryner
1987, 20-21). Hollenbach sensibly points out that the “heady rhetoric of
… human rights … is frequently the language of protest, of the manifesto
and of the political broadside. The appeal to rights has a ﬂamboyance and
volatility which make its use especially congenial in political conﬂict,” but
such rhetoric can quickly expand and come unmoored from its grounding
concepts and its logical chains of connection (1979, 11-12). Glendon
has argued that rights used as trumps – something asserted that one can’t
argue with or against – has led to an “intemperate rhetoric of personal
liberty [which] corrodes” the discourse foundations on which democracy
is built and operates, leading to standoffs politically (1991, 62) and Sandel
sees in the rights-based discussion of citizenship the social dissolution
of community (1987, 146-149). In more practical terms, new rights are
rarely no-cost, and in providing them or enforcing them the public does not
always acknowledge those costs, nor does the public particularly like the
inevitable tradeoffs inherent in choices among a growing number of rights
(Bryner 1987, 8-9). In this way, traditional arguments in favor of rights
from the Left have come to characterize the aggressive, argumentative
stance of the Right (an intemperate rhetoric of personal liberty corroding
discourse), while at the same time drawing theoretical responses which
advocate a slowing of the growth of rights to protect the ones in existence.
That is a powerful combination ready to be deployed against information
rights as human rights.
A Theoretical Approach for LIS
LIS arguments for informational rights reﬂect this broader context.
Reviewing a sampling of the LIS literature on such topics as information
ethics and the Library Bill of Rights (Fricke, Mathiesen, and Fallis 2000),
information work (Samek 2005), the practical application of information
work (Samek 2007), and information equity and democracy (Lievrouw
and Farb 2003; Doctor 1992; Reynolds 1992) along with those noted
earlier, reveals many of these same tensions shot through their analyses.
Does that mean that our literature and any notion of human information
rights are fatally compromised? No, I make these observations from a
friendly perspective and I support a broad concept of open, public, cultural
institutions, and believe that, in choosing to have such institutions, we
enact a certain set of expectations about their role and their relationship to
Progressive Librarian #38/39
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individuals and their communities. That is a rather abstract way of saying
that our best approach to human information rights – from the vantage
of democratic theory – is pragmatic. Information rights as human rights
begins with the example of what was taken away from African Americans
for one hundred years after Reconstruction (Liu 2006-2007), and the
practical problems for women and children when concepts of human rights
elide their particular vulnerabilities (Bunch 1990). After all, if human
rights can encompass a violently patriarchal society or one based on race,
are they universal? If those rights are universal and human, it must extend
to minorities, women and children as “the only universally available moral
vernacular that validates [their] claims” – as it should have for African
Americans 100 years ago (Ignatieff 2000, 330). Information rights thus
begin in a form of reciprocity: we would not wish to be abused in mind or
body, and so should not do so to others – strongly implying a freedom of
thought and expression (Ignatieff 1999). From there, Rorty urges us not
to appeal to reason, justice, or a contrast to a described reality to realize
rights – all such bases have been fundamentally contested; rather, he urges
us simply to make “invidious comparisons” and “invent a reality … by
selecting aspects of the world which lend themselves to … the worth-while
life” (Rorty 1990, 21-23). When we realize that laws and government
are only legitimate when they earn our recognition and assent, and that
human rights are at the core of that legitimacy (Habermas 1998), then the
right to the means to support and inform common deliberative experiences
should be “extensively empowered … and widely dispersed throughout
the institutions of state, economy, and civil society” (Warren 1996, 242).
In other words (and bringing these strands together), information rights as
human rights are pragmatic assertions of a better social order and better
arrangements for and among individuals through such state institutions as
schools, universities, and libraries. These institutions and the rights they
might pragmatically instantiate are not done for citizens, but by citizens for
themselves. We have learned from the need to pragmatically look at the
needs for human rights not among the powerful, but the disempowered,
and to root those rights in particularity of those needs in the interests of
invidious comparisons of an unrealized but possible future. This represents
a brief sketch of at least one way to avoid the theoretical entanglements of
human rights stopping information rights in their tracks.
Note
1

An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 2011 Information Ethics Roundtable
on Information Rights as Human Rights, held at the University of Arizona, April 15
(http://sites.google.com/site/informationethicsroundtable/Home/conference-call-forpapers). This paper makes a distinction between those who link Information Ethics
(IE) to rights (that is, they conceive of it in broad political terms), and those who
contextualize it less politically, like Robert Hauptman (arguably, the founder of IE)
who tends to focus on the application of regular ethical theory in new technological
contexts for plagiarism, or Mark Alﬁno, Luciano Floridi, Adam Moore, Kit Wellman or
Tony Doyle who all take different approaches (like utilitarianism or privacy theory or
censorship). The contents of The Handbook of Computer and Information Ethics edited
by Kenneth Einar Himma and Herman T. Tavani (Wiley, 2008) give a good indication
of how I arrived at those distinctions. I am grateful to PL editor Susan Maret for raising
this point with me.

Page 22

Progressive Librarian #38/39

References
Beitz, Charles R., and Robert E. Goodin. 2009. Global basic rights. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Bernstein, Richard. 2010. Paper presented at the Conference on Reading Hannah Arendt for
the 21st Century. University of Virginia. April 1.
Bentham, Jeremy. 1961. Anarchichal fallacies: Selections. In Society, law, and morality;
readings in social philosophy from classical and contemporary sources, ed. Frederick A.
Olafson, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Biron, Laura. 2011. John Locke and the labour theory of intellectual property: A new
interpretation. Paper presented to the Law & Philosophy Workshop, Georgetown
University. February 18.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1998. The essence of neoliberalism. Le Monde Diplomatique (English
edition) December.
Brown, Richard Evans. 1994. Theological interpretations of human rights : an analysis of
recent Roman Catholic papal encyclicals and the ethics of Jürgen Moltmann. Thesis (Ph.
D.) University of Virginia.
Bunch, Charlotte. 1990. Women’s rights as human rights: Towards a re-vision of human
rights. Human Rights Quarterly 12, no. 4: 486-498.
Bryner, Gary C. 1987. Constitutionalism and the politics of rights. In Constitutionalism and
rights, eds. Gary C. Bryner and Noel B. Reynolds, 7-32. Provo, UT: Brigham Young
University Press.
Castiglione, Dario. 2005. Symposium on Seyla Benhabib’s “The rights of others.” Democracy
& Society 3, no. 1: 20-21.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 08-205 (2010).
Dembour, Marie-Bénédicte. 2010. What are human rights? Four schools of thought. Human
Rights Quarterly 32, no. 1: 1-20.
Dewey, John. 1935. The future of liberalism. The Journal of Philosophy 32, no. 9: 225-230.
__. 1960c. Philosophies of freedom. In On experience, nature, and freedom: representative
selections, by John Dewey, ed. Richard J. Bernstein, 261-287. Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill. (Orig. pub. 1928.)
Doctor, Ronald D. 1992. Social equity and information technologies: moving toward
information democracy. Annual Review of Information Science & Technology 27, 4396.
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
Frické, Martin, Kay Mathiesen and Don Fallis. 2000. The ethical presuppositions behind the
Library Bill of Rights. Library Quarterly 70, No. 4: 468-491.
Glendon, Mary Ann. 1991. Rights talk: The impoverishment of political discourse. The Social
Contract Fall: 62-64.
Habermas, Jurgen. 1998. Remarks on legitimation through human rights. Modern Schoolman
LXXV, January: 87-100.
Hollenbach, David. 1979. Claims in conﬂict. New York: Paulist Press.
Howard, Marc M. 2006. The importance of national citizenship. Democracy & Society 4,
no. 1: 6-8.
Ignatieff, Michael. 2001. Human rights as politics; Human rights as idolatry. In The Tanner
Lectures on Human Values, ed. Grethe B. Peterson, 285-349. Salt Lake City: University
of Utah Press.
___. 1999. Human rights: The midlife crisis. New York Review of Books 46, no. 9: 58.
Katz, Michael S. 1982. Critical literacy: A conception of education as a moral right and a
social ideal. In The public school monopoly: A critical analysis of education and the
state in American society, ed. Robert B. Everhart, 193-223. San Francisco, CA: Paciﬁc
Institute for Public Policy Research.
__. 2008. Is there a right to education? A philosophical analysis through U.S. lenses. In
Education, democracy, and the moral life, eds. Michael S. Katz, Susan Verducci, and
Gert Biesta, 31-45. Dordrecht: Springer.
King, Colbert I. 2011. GOP to have-nots: Tough luck. Washington Post. Opinion. April 9.
Lievrouw, Leah A. and Sharon E. Farb. 2003. Information and equity. Annual Review of
Information Science and Technology 37, no. 1: 499-540.
Liu, Goodwin. 2006-2007. Education, equality, and national citizenship. Yale Law Journal
116, No. 2: 330-411
Locke, John. 1996. Second treatise of government. In Princeton Readings in Political

Progressive Librarian #38/39

Page 23

Thought, eds. Mitchell Cohen and Nicole Fermon, 243-279. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Mara, Gerald. 2005. Symposium on Seyla Benhabib’s “The rights of others.” Democracy &
Society 3, no. 1: 21-22.
___. 2008. The civic conversations of Thucydides and Plato: Classical political philosophy
and the limits of democracy. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Marshall, T.H. 2009. Citizenship and social class. In Inequality and Society, eds. Jeff Manza
and Michael Sauder, 148-154. New York: W.W. Norton.
Mathiesen, Kay. 2008. Access to Information as a Human Right. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1264666
Macpherson, C.B. 1966. The social bearings of Locke’s political theory. In Political Theory
and Ideology, ed. Judith N. Shklar, 66-78. New York: Macmillan.
___. 1967. Natural rights in Hobbes and Locke. In Political Theory and the Rights of Man,
ed. D.D. Raphael, 1-15. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Nickel, James, “Human Rights”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/
entries/rights-human/>.
Reynolds, Dennis. 1992. The Bill of Rights and beyond. In Citizen rights and access
to electronic information: The 1991 LITA President’s Program presentations and
background papers, ed. Dennis J. Reynolds, 3-31. Chicago, Ill: Library and Information
Technology Association.
Rorty, Richard. 1992. Feminism and pragmatism. In The Tanner Lectures on Human Values,
ed. Grethe B. Peterson, 1-35. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
Samek, Toni. 2007. Librarianship and Human Rights: A Twenty-ﬁrst century guide. Oxford:
CHANDOS Publishing.
___. 2005. Ethical reﬂection on 21st century information work: An address for teachers and
librarians. Progressive Librarian (25): 43-61.
Sandel, Michael J. 1987. The political theory of the procedural republic. In Constitutionalism
and rights, eds. Gary C. Bryner and Noel B. Reynolds, 141-156. Provo, UT: Brigham
Young University Press.
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Santa Clara County v. Southern Paciﬁc Railroad Co. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
Somers, Margaret R. 1993. Citizenship and the place of the public sphere. American
Sociological Review 58, no. 5: 587-620.
Young-Bruehl, Elizabeth. 2010. Paper presented at the Reading Hannah Arendt for the 21st
Century Conference. University of Virginia. April 1.
Warren, Mark E. 1996. “What should we expect from more democracy?.” Political Theory
24, no. 2: 241-270.
Wolin, Sheldon. 1996. Fugitive democracy. In Democracy and difference: Contesting
the boundaries of the political, ed. Seyla Benhabib, 31-45. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.

Page 24

Progressive Librarian #38/39

Copyright of Progressive Librarian is the property of Progressive Librarians Guild and its content may not be
copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written
permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

